Abstract: We develop a model in which, …rst, …rms design compensation schemes for their managers while subject to moral hazard and, second, …rms compete in Bertrand or Cournot fashion in the product market. We derive the strategic properties of managerial compensation levels and incentives. We show that the implications include: greater systematic risk may weaken the incentives of one …rm while strengthening those of a competitor; an increase in the idiosyncratic risk of a …rm causes all its competitors to adjust their incentives; and strategic considerations may account for the rise in U.S. CEO pay and the use of incentives.
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Introduction
Should a manager's compensation scheme be in ‡uenced by that of a competitor's manager? If so, what are the implications for corporate …nance? We demonstrate that, due to product market competition, managerial compensation levels and incentives across …rms in an industry are strategically related. Consequently, we show that a change in the corporate environment has two e¤ects: a direct e¤ect that arises due to the standard agency problem; and a strategic e¤ect which takes into account the strategic manner in which …rms respond to one another. This results in novel implications about the properties of managerial compensation schemes: a reversal may occur in the conventional wisdom about risk and incentives; changes in the corporate environment of a …rm cause all …rms in the industry to adjust their compensation schemes; and a ratcheting e¤ect of compensation levels and incentives may occur in response to changes in the corporate environment common to all …rms in the industry, such as systematic risk.
We study an industry composed of two heterogeneous …rms that are engaged in strategic product market competition (Bertrand or Cournot). Each risk-neutral …rm (principal) hires a risk-averse manager (agent) to operate the …rm. The marginal cost of production of a …rm is a function of the e¤ort exerted by its manager, a …rm-speci…c shock which captures idiosyncratic risk, and an industry-wide shock which captures systematic risk. Following Raith (2003) , …rms reward their managers on the basis of the extent to which they reduce costs of production. 1 We show there are countervailing e¤ects determining the strategic properties of managerial incentives. To characterize those properties and implications thereof, we derive reasonable conditions under which managerial incentives are strategic complements or substitutes. 2 These conditions relate to the type of competition in the product market, the demand for the product, and the properties of the strategic variables being used by …rms when competing in the product market. 3 If demand is linear and additively separable, then managerial incentives inherit the properties of the strategic variables (prices or quantities, depending on the type of competition). If …rms operate in a perfectly competitive market, then managerial incentives are solely determined by the usual trade-o¤ between risk sharing and the provision of incentives.
The manner in which managerial incentives respond to a change in the corporate environment may be decomposed into direct and strategic e¤ects. The direct e¤ect represents a …rm's response holding …xed its rival's incentives, while the strategic e¤ect represents a …rm's reaction to the change in its rival's incentives. Thus, a large direct e¤ect for one …rm translates into a large strategic e¤ect for its rival.
There are numerous implications stemming from the strategic nature of managerial incentives arising from product market competition. Consider the common wisdom originating from Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) that an increase in risk should be associated with a weakening of managerial incentives. We show this may no longer hold due to the strategic e¤ect. Suppose there is an increase in systematic risk and managerial incentives are strategic substitutes. Both …rms have a tendency to weaken their incentives due to risk-sharing considerations (the direct e¤ect). However, because managerial incen- 3 Sundaram, John, and John (1996) devise an empirical means by which to determine whether the strategic variables being used by …rms in the product market are strategic substitutes or complements. Their competitive strategy measure (CSM) is the correlation between the change in a …rm's pro…t margin (which is the change in net income over the change in net sales) and the change in its competitors'net sales (whereby all …rms in the same 4-digit SIC industry are included as competitors). If CSM is negative (positive), then the strategic variables are strategic substitutes (complements, respectively). The average CSM in their sample is 0:02 (with a median of 0:02), implying that their average sample …rm competes on the basis of strategic substitutes. Kedia (2006) uses the same procedure as in Sundaram, John, and John to study a sample of 656 …rms distributed over 196 4-digit SIC industries during the period 1984 to 1991. Kedia …nds that 29 percent of the 4-digit SIC industries in the sample do not engage in strategic interaction, 21 percent compete with only strategic complements, and 21 percent compete with only strategic substitutes, while the remainder compete with combinations of strategic complements and substitutes. Overall, Kedia …nds that industries with competition in prices among di¤erentiated goods are more likely to compete in strategic complements; industries where …rms compete in market share and where substantial investment is required in plant and equipment are more likely to compete in strategic substitutes; and industries with no strategic interaction are likely to be those with a large number of small …rms, and those with low entry and exit barriers, suggesting they are perfectly competitive. tives are strategic substitutes, if a …rm weakens its incentives, its rival has a tendency to respond by strengthening its incentives (the strategic e¤ect). When the strategic e¤ect is strong enough, one …rm weakens its incentives while another strengthens them. Our model therefore provides a potential novel explanation as to why the relationship between risk and incentives is ambiguous in the empirical literature. As emphasized by Prendergast (2002) , some empirical studies …nd that the link is positive ( Another implication of the strategic nature of managerial incentives is that all …rms in the industry react to changes in the corporate environment that should otherwise just a¤ect one …rm. For example, consider an increase in the idiosyncratic risk of a …rm, which causes the …rm to weaken the incentives of its manager (as in a standard agency model); if managerial incentives are strategic complements, then the rival responds by also weakening the incentives of its manager. Therefore, …rms may be adapting their compensation schemes not because of a change in their own environment, but because their competitors experienced a change in their corporate governance, for example.
We show in the Appendix that managerial compensation levels are also strategic. This has rami…cations in the context of benchmarking CEO pay, which is prevalent (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen 2008; Faulkender and Yang 2010). 4 We argue it is optimal for a …rm to take into account the compensation schemes of peer groups not just to ensure the CEO does not have an incentive to leave the …rm (i.e., to satisfy the CEO's reservation utility), but also to implement the strategic mechanisms we identify.
Finally, if managerial compensation schemes are strategic complements, then a ratcheting e¤ect occurs as compensation schemes react to changes in the corporate environment com-mon to all …rms in the industry. For example, consider a decline in systematic risk, which leads both …rms to strengthen their incentives due to risk-sharing (the direct e¤ect); since incentives are strategic complements, each …rm responds to its rival by further strengthening its incentives (the strategic e¤ect). Extrapolating these forces to a setting populated by many …rms, as each …rm in the industry reacts strategically to each competitor, the overall response is magni…ed as it permeates the entire industry. Thus, seemingly small changes in systematic risk can lead to dramatic changes in compensation levels and incentives. The The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes the setup of the model. Section 4 solves for the strategic properties of managerial incentives.
Section 5 derives theoretical implications of these strategic properties, and Section 6 discusses their empirical rami…cations. Section 7 concludes. An Appendix contains the proofs of all propositions and derives the strategic properties of managerial compensation levels, which parallel those of incentives.
Literature Review
We complement four literatures in corporate …nance and the theory of the …rm. The …rst literature pertains to the design of compensation schemes among …rms facing principal-agent problems that are engaged in product market competition. In Raith (2003) , an endogenous number of …rms compete in prices along a Salop circle. In Baggs and de Bettignies (2007), two …rms compete in prices at opposite ends of a Hotelling line. These models have homogeneous (or symmetric) …rms and are devoid of the strategic considerations we explore. The closest model to ours is due to Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) , wherein two …rms compete in Bertrand or Cournot fashion, which compares as follows. First, in our framework, uncertainty arises from shocks that a¤ect the …rm's cost of production, whereas in their model it is added onto the pro…t function of the …rm without providing a microfoundation. This uncertainty is the source of risk that the principal must balance in providing managerial incentives. Second, their model is not solvable when managers exert e¤ort, such that the results they discuss pertain to a setup in which there are no agency problems. Third, in their model, managers are risk-neutral, so the role of risk cannot be examined; whereas in our model managers are risk-averse. Finally, and most importantly, …rms are symmetric in their model and the strategic considerations we identify are not addressed.
The second literature to which we are related links the severity of the principal-agent problem to the extent of competition in the product market. Hart (1983) , Scharfstein (1988) , Hermalin (1992) , Schmidt (1997) , and Raith (2003) determine the impact of competition (often measured by the number of …rms) on the provision of managerial e¤ort. However, these papers do not enable compensation contracts to in ‡uence competition in the strategic manner that we identify. We discuss the empirical rami…cations pertaining to this literature in Section 6 in the context of our model.
The third literature concerns examining the broad ways in which managers should be compensated in light of product market competition. Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) derive the extent to which the agent's compensation scheme should be made contingent on performance measures other than pro…t, …nding that positive weight should be placed on sales due to product market competition. These models are devoid of moral hazard (or adverse selection) and risk aversion. 6 The fourth literature shows that debt contracts in ‡uence product market competition.
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Rotemberg and Scharfstein (1990) , and Maksimovic (1988) demonstrate how capital structure changes the intensity of competition. In these models, …rms initially choose their capital structure and then compete in the product market. Debt serves to commit managers to be more or less aggressive depending on parameter values.
Our model provides analogous …ndings on the relationship between compensation contracts and product market competition.
Finally, our paper relates to a broad question posed in game theory as to whether strategic substitutability or complementarity in a static framework translates into strategic substitutability or complementarity in a dynamic framework, e.g., Echenique (2004) 3 The Model
Timing and Structure of the Game
There are two …rms (the principals) and two managers (the agents) in an industry. 
where " i is a …rm-speci…c normal shock with mean zero and variance 2 i that is independent across …rms, " is a normal shock common to both …rms with mean zero and variance 2 , and c is an industry-wide parameter (that re ‡ects the technology of the industry). The sensitivity of marginal cost to managerial e¤ort has a …rm-speci…c component, i , and an industry-wide 7 The literature that combines product market competition with agency problems is typically ambiguous as to exactly who constitutes the agent. The agent may be the CEO, a product line manager, or a plant manager, for example. When discussing some empirical implications of the model, we interpret the agent as the CEO. component, . 8 The volatility 2 i measures the …rm-speci…c (i.e., idiosyncratic) risk of …rm i; and 2 measures industry-wide risk, which may thus be interpreted as systematic risk. For ease of exposition, we assume that " i and " are independently distributed. 9 Both agents have the e¤ort cost function e 2 i =2 and reservation utility r. As is common in the agency literature, both agents have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences with the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion R.
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The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Agents are exogenously matched to principals.
2. Principals design contracts that satisfy individual rationality and incentive compatibility. The contracts are observed by the two …rms.
3. Agents accept or reject the contracts and exert unobservable e¤ort if they accept.
4. Firms engage in Cournot or Bertrand competition. 5. Shocks (and thereby costs of production) are realized and agents are compensated.
We solve the game using backwards induction as follows. First, we derive the manager's optimal e¤ort policy as a function of the incentives he is o¤ered by the …rm. Second, we derive the Nash equilibrium prices or quantities as a function of managerial incentives. Third, we solve the principal's problem, which entails choosing the compensation scheme of the manager that maximizes …rm pro…t subject to the conditions that the manager signs the contract (individual rationality) and exerts the desired level of e¤ort (incentive compatibility). In designing its compensation scheme, each …rm anticipates that the strength of the incentives o¤ered its manager a¤ects not just its optimal price or quantity policy, but also that of its rival.
The Manager' s E¤ort Problem
This stage of the game is the same regardless of the type of product market competition (Bertrand or Cournot). Following Raith (2003) , the principal compensates the agent according to the extent to which he reduces the …rm's marginal cost of production. Speci…cally, the contract takes the linear form
where i represents the agent's salary and i the agent's incentives. Let
denote the vector of managerial incentives. The term c c i = ( i + )e i + " i + " is the performance measure by which the manager is evaluated. Thus, …rms potentially di¤er along two dimensions: the precision of the performance measure 1=( Making the manager's compensation contingent on the extent of the cost reduction is informationally e¢ cient given that e¤ort reduces cost (Holmstrom 1979 ). However, equivalently, we could have assumed that the agent's compensation depends on realized pro…t and the compensation scheme entails relative performance evaluation (RPE). This can be done as follows, which parallels the procedure proposed by Raith (2003) . The realized pro…t of …rm i depends on its own and rival's costs, c i and c j . By solving the system of realized pro…ts with respect to marginal costs, we can express each …rm's marginal cost as a function of its own and rival's pro…ts. Thus, we can substitute c i into the linear compensation scheme (2) to obtain a compensation scheme that depends on the realized pro…ts of …rms i and j.
The certainty equivalent of agent i is
This yields the e¤ort policy
such that the expected marginal cost of …rm i is given by
The stronger are managerial incentives, the smaller is the …rm's (expected) marginal cost of production. By virtue of our timing structure, expected pro…ts and optimal prices or quantities only depend on expected costs.
Product Market Demand
Following Singh and Vives (1984) , suppose that U (q 1 ; q 2 ) is a strictly concave and strictly monotone utility function representing the preferences of a representative consumer. Let q = (q 1 ; q 2 ) and p = (p 1 ; p 2 ) denote the vector of quantities and prices, respectively. The representative consumer maximizes U (q) pq, which gives rise to an inverse demand system
Inverse demand functions are downward sloping, @d i =@q i < 0, and the cross e¤ects, @d i =@q j , are negative because the goods are substitutes. The inverse demand system can be inverted to yield a direct demand system q i = D i (p). Direct demand functions are downward sloping, @D i =@p i < 0, and @D i =@p j is positive since the products are substitutes.
Furthermore, we assume that the "own e¤ect"j@D i =@p i j or j@d i =@q i j is larger than the "cross e¤ect"j@D i =@p j j or j@d i =@q j j. The expected gross pro…t of …rm i in terms of prices is
and in terms of quantities iŝ
To ensure second-order conditions are satis…ed, we assume that expected gross pro…t functions are strictly concave in their own strategic variable:
We make the following assumptions to ensure that reaction functions in the product market are well-behaved and have slopes less than one in absolute value so as to obtain a unique price or quantity Nash equilibrium:
Assumption 2 (Stability and Uniqueness)
We assume prices are strategic complements and quantities are strategic substitutes:
12 Assumption 3 (Strategic Substitutability and Complementarity)
We introduce the following de…nitions. As stated earlier, the products sold by the two …rms are substitutes, implying @ i =@p j > 0 and @^ i =@q j < 0. In the context of Bertrand competition, we say that if an increase in the rival's price raises the …rm's pro…t at an increasing rate, then the products exhibit increasing substitutability, i.e. @ if it does so at a decreasing rate, then they exhibit decreasing substitutability, i.e. @ Finally, we say that the demand function D i (p) exhibits supermodularity (submodularity) with respect to prices if
This a¤ects the strength of strate-
makes the degree of strategic complementarity stronger if and only if demand is supermodular with respect to prices. Intuitively, an increase in the rival's price bene…ts the …rm; with supermodularity (submodularity), the higher is the …rm's price, the more (less, respectively) the …rm bene…ts from the increase in the rival's price. If demand is additively separable, then the e¤ect disappears, such that @ 2 D i = (@p i @p j ) = 0.
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with respect to its price p i to yield the …rst-order condition (FOC) 13 Similarly, in the context of Cournot competition, we say that if an increase in the rival's quantity decreases the …rm's pro…t at an increasing rate, then the products exhibit increasing substitutability, i.e. @ The second-order condition (SOC) is satis…ed by virtue of Assumption 1. We denote the unique price equilibrium by
of …rm i at the optimum. We discuss below the three mechanisms by which the managerial incentives o¤ered to manager i in ‡uence the gross pro…t of …rm i.
The following lemma derives the manner in which managerial incentives a¤ect equilibrium prices:
Lemma 1 (Incentives and Prices with Bertrand Competition) The equilibrium price of …rm i is decreasing in the incentives of its manager and the incentives of its rival's manager, i.e. @p i =@ i < 0 and @p i =@ j < 0.
Suppose …rm i strengthens the incentives of its manager. This spurs the manager of …rm i to exert greater e¤ort, which lowers the …rm's expected marginal cost and thereby leads the …rm to charge a lower price for its product, i.e. @p i =@ i < 0. Given the strategic complementarity of prices, the rival responds by lowering its price, @p j =@ i < 0.
We now derive the equilibrium set of managerial incentives. The principal associated with …rm i maximizes the …rm's net pro…t (i.e., net of the agent's expected total compensation)
subject to the individual rationality (IR) constraint of the agent:
and the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint of the agent given by the e¤ort policy e 
. Applying the e¤ort policy, the expected total compensation of the agent becomes
B i
The FOC with respect to
The incentives of the manager a¤ect the principal's net pro…t through four di¤erent channels. The …rst two operate via the product market by in ‡uencing the …rm's and rival's prices, while the latter two arise in an isolated principal-agent problem (i.e., they represent the usual trade-o¤ between risk-sharing and incentives). First, there is the term
, which captures the extent to which the gross pro…t of the …rm is in ‡uenced by the impact of managerial incentives on its own price. Because the …rm chooses in a later stage of the game the price that maximizes its gross pro…t, this e¤ect, by the envelope theorem, disappears.
Second, there is the term
, which captures the extent to which the gross pro…t of the …rm is in ‡uenced by the impact of managerial incentives on its rival's price. We label this the strategic e¤ect, which arises because @p i =@ B j 6 = 0, following from the fact that 
an increase in incentives induces greater e¤ort and exposes the risk-averse agent to more risk, both of which cause the principal to enhance the agent's expected total compensation. Overall, the bene…t from strengthening incentives originates from the reduction in marginal cost, while the cost is manifested via the (negative) strategic e¤ect and increased compensation.
The managerial incentives of …rm i respond to a change in the managerial incentives of …rm j as follows:
Second-order condition (SOC) of the principal's problem .
To characterize the strategic properties of managerial incentives, we determine the conditions under which they are strategic substitutes or complements. Suppose …rm j o¤ers stronger incentives j to its manager. How should …rm i respond in terms of its incentives i ? There are three (possibly) opposing e¤ects that are present in the numerator of (14) .
To better understand these three e¤ects, we examine the second term in (13) , which constitutes the strategic e¤ect and from which the three e¤ects are derived. The strategic e¤ect is negative because when …rm i strengthens its incentives i , it lowers its marginal cost and its own price, which in turn triggers an aggressive price response on the part of its rival j, lowering …rm i's pro…t. How is the strategic e¤ect in ‡uenced by a change in j , such as an increase in j ?
First, because …rm j commits to being more aggressive when setting its price in the next stage, …rm i's best-response, given that prices are strategic complements, is to also lower its price. This is achieved by strengthening the incentives of its manager, i.e., i increases, which is captured by the …rst term in the numerator of (14) .
Second, the second term in the numerator of (14) is negative if
This follows from the proof of Lemma 1, and in particular equation (22), from which we infer
where
given that > 0 from Assumption 2 and @D i =@p i < 0, implying that an increase in j leads to a higher j@p j =@ i j (recall that this term is negative). This hurts …rm i's pro…t more, inducing …rm i to respond by weakening its incentives i in order to mitigate this negative e¤ect. If, on the other hand, demand is submodular, then …rm i responds by strengthening its incentives. Therefore, the second e¤ect operates in the same direction as the …rst e¤ect if demand is submodular. The second e¤ect is absent if demand is additively separable.
Third, when …rm i becomes more aggressive, it triggers an even more aggressive response on the part of …rm j in the pricing stage of the game. This hurts …rm i's pro…t when demand exhibits decreasing substitutability. To see this, note that the pro…t of …rm i is increasing in the price of its rival p j , and, under decreasing substitutability, it is concave in p j . The strategic e¤ect in this case becomes more negative when …rm j strengthens its incentives j .
14 Firm i loses more by strengthening its incentives, so it lowers i . This third e¤ect, which is captured by the third term in the numerator of (14), operates in the opposite direction from the …rst e¤ect. Under increasing substitutability, however, both e¤ects operate in the same direction. This third e¤ect is absent if demand is linear in the rival's price.
To summarize, if demand functions exhibit strong supermodularity and decreasing substitutability, relative to the e¤ect of strategic complementarity, then the second and third terms in the numerator of (14) If demand is linear and additively separable in prices (e.g.,
only the …rst term in the numerator of (14) are important. Irrespective of the strategic properties of managerial incentives, it is always the case that each agent earns his reservation utility. Therefore, if a …rm weakens the incentives of its manager in response to an action by its competitor, this may be accompanied by an adjustment in the manager's salary so as to ensure retention. 15 Given the continuity of the principal's pro…t function with respect to and the fact that i lies in a compact set, existence of equilibrium in stage 1 of the game is guaranteed if the principal's pro…t function is quasi-concave in i . This arises if the degree of constant relative risk aversion R and/or the variances 2 and 2 i (which do not a¤ect equilibrium prices p ) are large enough; see the denominator of (14) . This also implies that we have single-valued best-responses, which according to Proposition 1, slope either up or down. For a unique equilibrium f demand, this condition holds for a wide range of parameter values, but we do not have general conditions on fundamentals that would guarantee this condition and hence uniqueness. In any case, the comparative statics we perform below in ( 1 ; 2 ) space can be performed locally around any stable equilibrium, without changing our insights qualitatively.
Cournot Competition in the Product Market
The analysis in this sub-section parallels the scenario with Bertrand competition. 16 Firm
2 )) q i with respect to its quantity q i to yield the FOC
The SOC is satis…ed by virtue of Assumption 1. We denote the unique quantity equilibrium by fq 1 ( ), q 2 ( )g. The following lemma derives the manner in which managerial incentives a¤ect equilibrium quantities: The principal's objective iŝ
…rm j as follows:
The intuition underlying the strategic properties of managerial incentives is akin to that we o¤ered in the Bertrand competition case, with one exception. From (16), the quantity equilibrium fq 1 ( ), q 2 ( )g is linear in the marginal cost of each …rm and thereby managerial incentives . Thus, there is no second e¤ect (i.e., demand supermodularity or submodularity does not play a role), implying only the …rst and third e¤ects remain. 17 The next proposition summarizes our …ndings. 
Theoretical Implications of Strategic Managerial Incentives
The manner in which managerial incentives respond to a change in the corporate environment may be decomposed into direct and strategic e¤ects. The direct e¤ect represents the amount by which a …rm's incentives respond to the change in the corporate environment holding …xed its rival's incentives. The strategic e¤ect represents the amount by which a …rm's incentives react to the change in its rival's incentives. Therefore, the direct and strategic e¤ects are interrelated, the latter to some degree re ‡ecting the former. A large direct e¤ect for one …rm typically translates into a large strategic e¤ect for the other …rm.
We …rst consider a change in the corporate environment that is common to both …rms, and then a change in the corporate environment that is speci…c to one …rm. For ease of exposition, we focus on the role of risk, such that the former pertains to systematic risk, while the latter pertains to idiosyncratic risk. However, all the arguments we put forth are applicable across a broad range of changes in the corporate environment, such as those brought about by shifts in managerial practices and corporate governance. For example, when discussing a change in systematic risk, we could alternatively be referring to the passing of Sarbanes-Oxley (in the sense that it a¤ects all …rms in the industry); and when discussing a change in the idiosyncratic risk of a …rm, we could alternatively be referring to a change in the composition of its board of directors.
Strategic Managerial Incentives and Systematic Risk
Consider an increase in systematic risk 2 . We will show that the direct e¤ect yields the "traditional" response that one would expect from a standard agency model, while the strategic e¤ect operates in the same or opposite direction from the direct e¤ect depending on whether managerial incentives are strategic complements or substitutes, respectively. If managerial incentives are strategic substitutes and the strategic e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, then the strategic e¤ect may overpower the direct e¤ect to yield an "unusual" response for one …rm and a "traditional" response for another. If managerial incentives are strategic complements, then the strategic e¤ect operates in the same direction as the direct e¤ect, such that both …rms experience "traditional" responses; however, the responses are stronger than would be predicted by a standard agency model, leading to a ratcheting e¤ect.
Managerial Incentives are Strategic Substitutes
Suppose managerial incentives are strategic substitutes and …rms compete in Bertrand fashion. 19 Holding constant the managerial incentives of …rm j, from (13), we infer that the best-response incentives curve of …rm i shifts as follows in response to the increase in systematic risk:
Second-order condition (SOC) of the principal's problem
As expected, greater systematic risk implies lower incentives, all else being equal. But 19 See Proposition 1 for the conditions under which this arises. For ease of exposition, we focus on the case in which …rms compete in Bertrand fashion. The same arguments apply if …rms compete in Cournot fashion. 20 Note that this expression does not describe the change in equilibrium incentives; rather, it describes the way in which each best-response incentives curve shifts. in this strategic environment, all else cannot be equal, because the rival responds. Owing to the strategic substitutability of managerial incentives, in equilibrium, it may very well be the case that one …rm has strengthened the incentives o¤ered its manager. For this to occur, heterogeneous responses to a change in 2 are required (i.e., d Figure 1 for …rm 1, then it outweighs the direct e¤ect, the net result of which is a positive relationship between systematic risk and incentives for …rm 1 (and a negative relationship between systematic risk and incentives for …rm 2).
The direct and strategic e¤ects may be decomposed as follows using to point C represents the amount by which the incentives of …rm 1 strengthen due to the response by …rm 2 to the increase in systematic risk, capturing the strategic e¤ect of …rm 1. Because …rm 2 weakens its incentives signi…cantly as a consequence of the increase in systematic risk (i.e., the downward shift in BR 2 is large), …rm 1 responds by strengthening its incentives considerably since incentives are strategic substitutes. In this example, the strategic e¤ect is strong enough to overpower the direct e¤ect, such that …rm 1 experiences a net increase in its incentives (from 1 to 1 ). The move from point B 2 to point C represents the amount by which the incentives of …rm 2 weaken due to the response by …rm 1 to the increase in systematic risk, capturing the strategic e¤ect of …rm 2.
To identify which …rm may strengthen its managerial incentives in response to an increase in systematic risk, consider the following. In Figure 1 , …rm 2 has a large response (direct e¤ect) to the increase in risk, which leads …rm 1 to have a strong strategic e¤ect; and …rm 1 has a small response (direct e¤ect) to the increase in systematic risk, which leads …rm 2 to have a weak strategic e¤ect. The net e¤ects are that …rm 1 strengthens its incentives while …rm 2 weakens them. Therefore, the …rm that is less sensitive to systematic risk (i.e., the one with the small direct e¤ect) is the one for which we obtain an unusual response.
In Raith (2003) , piece rates are positively correlated with the variance of …rm pro…t across markets that di¤er in product substitutability, market size, or entry costs. Therefore, in Raith, a positive link between risk and incentives arises across heterogeneous industries.
By contrast, we may obtain positive and negative links across heterogeneous …rms in the same industry.
If managerial incentives are strategic substitutes, but the strategic e¤ect does not overpower the direct e¤ect, then the strategic e¤ect serves to dampen the response of managerial incentives to a change in the corporate environment common to all …rms in the industry. 
Managerial Incentives are Strategic Complements
Suppose managerial incentives are strategic complements. Then the strategic e¤ect operates in the same direction as the direct e¤ect. Thus, strategic considerations serve to amplify the response of managerial incentives to a change in the corporate environment common to both …rms. Consider an increase in systematic risk 2 , as illustrated in Figure 3 . The moves from point A to points B 1 and B 2 representing the direct e¤ects of …rms 1 and 2 are relatively weak. In the absence of strategic considerations, neither …rm would respond signi…cantly to the increase in systematic risk. However, when we take into account the strategic e¤ects represented by the moves from points B 1 and B 2 to point C, we see that the net changes in incentives are considerable. Extrapolating these …ndings into industries characterized by multiple …rms competing against each other, we infer that a drastic ratcheting e¤ect may occur. That is, seemingly small changes in the corporate environment common to all …rms in the industry can lead to dramatic changes in managerial incentives. As each …rm in the industry reacts strategically to each other …rm, the overall response is magni…ed as it permeates the entire industry. 
Managerial Incentives and Idiosyncratic Risk
When there is a change in the idiosyncratic risk of a …rm, the best-response incentives curve of that …rm shifts, while the other …rm experiences a movement along its best-response incentives curve. Thus, in light of strategic considerations, all …rms in the industry respond to changes in a …rm's idiosyncratic risk. To illustrate this, suppose managerial incentives are strategic complements and consider an increase in the idiosyncratic risk 2 1 faced by …rm 1. This shifts downward the best-response incentives curve of …rm 1, and represents a movement along the best-response incentives curve of …rm 2. Firm 1 weakens its incentives due to risk-sharing considerations, and …rm 2 responds by weakening its incentives since managerial incentives are strategic complements, as shown in Figure 4 . In a traditional agency model, there would be no change in the incentives o¤ered by …rm 2 (that is, there is no strategic e¤ect). In broad terms, this means that when a …rm experiences a change in its speci…c corporate environment that leads it to adapt its compensation scheme, all the …rm's competitors react by adapting their compensation schemes; if managerial incentives are strategic complements (substitutes), then their reactions move in the same (opposite, respectively) direction. 
Empirical Implications of Strategic Managerial Incentives
Our model suggests numerous avenues for future empirical research. First, the strategic nature of managerial compensation schemes is itself empirically testable. That is, we should …nd that a change in the compensation scheme o¤ered by a …rm should cause its rivals to respond by changing their compensation schemes. These predictions are testable in terms of both compensation levels and incentives. Because …rms typically engage in various forms of competition utilizing a wide variety of strategic tools spanning a number of products and industries, observed changes in compensation schemes re ‡ect the agglomeration of all these (direct and strategic) e¤ects. Indeed, Kedia (2006) …nds that 29 percent of 4-digit SIC industries use both strategic complements and substitutes when competing. Hence, we postulate that the most practical approach is to test directly the strategic relationship of compensation levels and incentives, rather than attempt to infer them from the characteristics of the product markets in which the …rms are competing. If the compensation schemes of a collection of …rms are not found to be strategic, then the model predicts that those …rms are engaged in perfect competition, or the strategic e¤ects we identi…ed are weak. Kedia …nds that 29 percent of 4-digit SIC industries are not engaged in strategic interaction, suggesting they are perfectly competitive.
Second, the strategic property of compensation levels has rami…cations in terms of the setting and formulation of benchmark pay (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen 2008; Faulkender and Yang 2010). In evaluating the importance of benchmarking, the empirical literature has appealed to the agency theoretic prediction that, at the optimum, an agent should be o¤ered his reservation utility (in a standard model with moral hazard). Our analysis suggests there is also a strategic motive stemming from the product market. In a random sample of 100 S&P 500 …rms, Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen study proxy statements to …nd that peer groups are typically based on industry and size, suggesting they may be competitors;
and that the majority of …rms using benchmarking target their pay levels at or above the median of their peer group. The key point we make is that benchmarking (via formal and informal means) may be implemented not only to ensure the CEO remains with the …rm by setting reservation wages, but also as a consequence of the fact that the …rms are competing strategically in the marketplace. Third, the model predicts that if compensation schemes are strategic complements, then a ratcheting e¤ect of CEO compensation levels and incentives occurs. Speci…cally, consider a change in the corporate environment common to all …rms in the industry that leads them to increase their compensation levels and incentives (the "direct" e¤ect). Due to strategic complementarity, each …rm responds to the other by further increasing its compensation (the "strategic" e¤ect). It is thereby possible that strategic considerations contributed towards the dramatic rise in U. Fourth, in examining the empirical link between managerial compensation schemes and changes in the corporate environment, we propose that such changes be decomposed into components that are …rm-speci…c versus common to all …rms whenever possible. For example, …rm risk should be decomposed into idiosyncratic and systematic risk. The model predicts that managerial incentives respond to a change in a …rm's speci…c corporate environment (e.g., idiosyncratic risk) in the usual fashion consistent with agency theory, whereas managerial incentives may respond to a change in the corporate environment common to all …rms in the industry (e.g., systematic risk) in a fashion that dispels traditional agency theory.
Fifth, future empirical work should test the prediction that a change in the corporate environment speci…c to a …rm may cause not just the …rm itself to adjust its compensation scheme, but also cause the …rm's rivals to adjust their compensation schemes due to the strategic e¤ects we identi…ed. We showed that while an increase in the idiosyncratic risk of a …rm leads it to weaken its managerial incentives (in accord with traditional agency theory), the rival responds by strengthening (weakening) its incentives if compensation schemes are strategic substitutes (complements, respectively). In this sense, idiosyncratic risk may become endowed with characteristics previously solely attributed to systematic risk. Another example would be a change in a …rm's board of directors that leads the …rm to change the compensation scheme of its CEO. The …rm's competitors may react by adapting their compensation schemes even though they were not directly a¤ected by the change in the …rm's board; such reactions would not relate to the retention concern, but instead the fact that managers may have to be incentivized more or less aggressively to be successful in the product market. Sixth, the relationship between managerial compensation schemes and the corporate environment common to all …rms in the industry may be asymmetric across …rms, suggesting that a broad set of moderating factors should be considered in empirical studies of executive compensation. For example, the model predicts that, if …rms are heterogeneous and managerial incentives are strategic substitutes, then an increase in systematic risk may strengthen the incentives o¤ered by one set of …rms and weaken the incentives o¤ered by another set.
It is important to emphasize that this holds true across …rms in the same industry, and not just across industries. This may explain why some empirical studies …nd that the re- 
Conclusion
This paper demonstrated that managerial compensation schemes are strategic due to product market competition. We derived reasonable conditions under which managerial compensation levels and incentives are strategic substitutes or complements. Second, one may expand the set of strategic tools being wielded by …rms when competing in the product market. We focused on the traditional forms of competition emphasized in microeconomics, namely price and quantity competition. However, our basic arguments should also be applicable under other, perhaps more exotic, forms of competition. For example, the realm of competition may include capital expenditures; R&D expenses to improve the quality of the product and lower costs of production; advertising expenses to increase demand; and the setting of product characteristics, such as design, features, and quality. One would then have to determine whether such strategic variables are strategic complements or substitutes, and the extent to which the strategy of one …rm a¤ects the demand of another.
Third, along the lines of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) , Rotemberg and Scharfstein (1990) , and Maksimovic (1988) , future theoretical work should aim to uncover the strategic properties of capital structures that arise from product market competition. Just as …rms react to one another's compensation schemes, one may …nd that …rms react to one another's capital structures. The literature shows that debt serves as a commitment device that disciplines management towards behaving with a more aggressive or defensive posture depending on the characteristics of the product market. Thus, we postulate that, under certain conditions, …rms make capital structure decisions to incentivize their managers to respond to and be more successful against their competitors in the product market.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We invoke the Implicit Function Theorem using the system of …rst order conditions given by (8) :
is the determinant of the Jacobian of the system of …rst-order conditions. From Assumption 2, is strictly positive. It then follows that
The above signs follow from Assumption 1 and the facts that prices are strategic complements and demand is downward sloping in its own price. Also note that the strength of @p i =@ j depends positively on how strong the strategic complementarity
The strength of the strategic complementarity in turn depends on i . If demand is supermodular, @ 2 D i = (@p j @p i ) > 0, then the higher the i the higher the @p i =@ j . The opposite holds when demand is submodular,
For use in the proof of Proposition 1, note, using (22) 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
We would like to determine how j a¤ects i (the slope of principal i's reaction function with respect to incentives). We will totally di¤erentiate the …rst order condition (13) . The …rst term in (13) is zero from the envelope theorem, the second term is the strategic e¤ect, the third term captures the direct e¤ect of incentives on production cost and the last term is the cost associated with incentivizing the agent. The strategic term
depends on = ( 1 ; 2 ) as follows: …rst, a¤ects the equilibrium prices (p 1 ; p 2 ) and thus the pro…t function B i , which suggests that it a¤ects the term @ B i =@p j and second, a¤ects the way equilibrium prices react to changes in incentives, i.e., the term @p j =@ B i . Therefore, di¤erentiating the strategic e¤ect with respect to either i or j will yield three terms.
Furthermore, the third term in (13), since cost reduction depends only on i linearly, is independent of . Thus, by totally di¤erentiating (13) with respect to i and j we obtain:
From Lemma 1 we know that
If d i =d j < 1 we obtain a unique equilibrium ( 1 ; 2 ). The denominator of d i =d j is the second derivative of the pro…t function with respect to i , which is negative due to the SOC of the principal's problem. The sign of the numerator is ambiguous and we discuss the three e¤ects (stemming from the three di¤erent terms in the numerator) in the main text.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
We invoke the Implicit Function Theorem using the system of …rst-order conditions given by (16) :
The above signs follow from Assumption 1 and the fact that quantities are strategic substitutes. Note that the above derivatives do not depend on .
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Following a similar logic as in the proof of Proposition 1, we totally di¤erentiate (18) with respect to i and j in order to determine the slope of the reaction functions:
From (24), @ 2 q j =@ 2 i and @ 2 q j = @ i @ j are also zero (incentives do not a¤ect the slope of q i with respect to i or j ). Then, the above expression becomes
The denominator of d i =d j is the second derivative of the pro…t function with respect to i , which is negative due to the SOC of the principal's problem. The sign of the numerator is ambiguous and we discuss the two e¤ects (stemming from the two di¤erent terms in the numerator) in the main text.
B Appendix: Strategic Managerial Compensation Levels
We show that the expected total compensation levels of managers exhibit the same strategic properties as managerial incentives. To achieve this, we transform the …rm's problem into one in which compensation levels instead of incentives are being chosen. To begin with, apply the binding individual rationality (IR) constraint, E(
to obtain an expression for the manager's incentives as a function of his expected total compensation:
The …rm's expected marginal cost becomes E(c i ) = c 2 (E(t i ) r)
The greater is the manager's expected total compensation, the smaller is the …rm's marginal cost of production.
We consider Bertrand competition. The case with Cournot competition is similar, so it is omitted. For the sake of brevity, we do not state the equivalent assumptions that are required, which can be inferred from the corresponding cases with managerial incentives.
As before, …rm i's expected gross pro…t is given by i (p) = (p i (c
Applying equation (26) , it becomes i (p) = p i c 2 (E(t i ) r) ( i + ) 2 + R(
The following lemma derives the manner in which compensation levels a¤ect equilibrium prices:
Lemma 3 (Compensation and Prices with Bertrand Competition) The equilibrium price of …rm i is decreasing in the expected total compensation of its manager, i.e. @p i =@E(t i ) < 0, and decreasing in the expected total compensation of its rival's manager, since prices are strategic complements, i.e. @p i =@E(t j ) < 0. is the determinant of the Jacobian of the system of …rst-order conditions. The remainder follows as in the case with managerial incentives.
The intuition is the same as in the case with managerial incentives. If …rm i enhances the compensation of its manager, this lowers the …rm's expected marginal cost and thereby price due to greater managerial e¤ort, i.e. @p i =@E(t i ) < 0. Given the strategic complementarity of prices, the rival responds by lowering its price, @p j =@E(t i ) < 0.
We now derive the equilibrium set of expected total compensation levels. 
The FOC with respect to E(t , which captures the extent to which the …rm's gross pro…t is in ‡uenced by the impact of its manager's compensation on its rival's price (the "strategic" e¤ect). Third, there is the term @ 
The rest is the same as the statement in Proposition 1, where the three e¤ects (similar to the three terms in the numerator of (31)) are presented and discussed.
Proof. We totally di¤erentiate (30) with respect to both compensation levels in order to determine the slope of the reaction functions:
( @ The term @ 2 i = (@E(t i )@E(t j )) is zero since the cost reduction in …rm i does not depend on the compensation of the rival …rm. The remainder follows as in the proof of Proposition 1.
